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This paper reports an experiment on a location game, the so-called “Price-Competition on the Circle.” 
There are n symmetric firms equidistantly located on a circle. Consumers are uniformly distributed. Each 
consumer buys one and only one unit from that firm whose price, including the cost of transportation, is 
the lowest, provided such a price is below a maximum willingness to pay. Experiments, extended over 
200 periods, were run with 3, 4, and 5 participants. Subjects did not receive any information about the 
relationship between prices and profits, but they received feedback on prices and profits of two neighbors 
after each period. The evaluation compares predictions derived from imitation equilibrium (Selten and 
Ostmann 2001) and Cournot equilibrium, as well as symmetric joint-profit maximization. The results 
qualitatively favor imitation equilibrium, as long as no cooperation is observed. 
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It has often been proposed in the literature that competitors in an oligopolistic market 
may be guided by imitation rather than by profit calculations. Horst Todt (1970, 1972, 
1975) has expressed this view in connection with his experiments on a locational 
oligopoly, involving investment and pricing decisions of hotels in three health resource 
towns. Later, the idea of imitation as a driving force of competition has been worked out 
by various contributors to evolutionary game theory (Vega-Redondo 1997; Rhode and 
Stegeman 2001). In this literature processes of imitation are described which may not 
converged to Nash equilibrium but to other outcomes, e.g., the competitive equilibrium 
in the symmetric Cournot model.  
 
In a paper by Selten and Ostmann (2001) the notion of imitation equilibrium is 
introduced. The imitation equilibrium is a behavioral static equilibrium concept, which 
can be compared to equilibrium points in pure strategies like the Nash equilibrium. 
Learning processes often involve several parameters which have to be estimated from 
the data. The concept of imitation equilibrium, however, does not involve any parameter 
and therefore permits a direct comparison with the static equilibrium point notion of 
non-cooperative game theory. In the paper by Selten and Ostmann, imitation equilibria 
have been determined for the symmetric Cournot model with constant average cost, for 
the asymmetric Cournot duopoly with constant average cost, and for a simple 
oligopolistic model of price competition on the circle. The experiments reported here 
concern the last of these three examples. 
 
In the case of the oligopolistic model of price competition on the circle, imitation 
equilibrium predicts stronger competition for markets with three firms, than for those 
with four or five firms. This is a surprising theoretical result since usually one expects 
competition to get stronger with an increase in the number of competitors. It seemed to 
be an interesting research question to what extent the prediction of imitation equilibrium 
theory is supported by experimental data.  
 
It is plausible to assume that imitation is favored by a lack of knowledge about the 
connection of prices and profits. Accordingly, subjects did not get any information 
about how the profit depends on the prices. They were not informed about intervening 
 1variables like costs and sales, and they were not told that they were involved in a spatial 
competition situation. They were not even informed about the number of competitors in 
the market. They knew that they have to determine a price and that their profits would 
depend deterministically on all prices of the same period, and not on those on earlier 
periods. They got feedback about own price and profits, and the prices and profits of the 
left and right immediate neighbors, but they did not know anything beyond this. With 
these information conditions, we wanted to give the best chance to processes of 
imitation. 
 
More than we expected it turned out that cooperation was often observed in the 
experiments. Probably, the frame of the experiment suggested the idea to subjects that a 
price increase by everyone may be good for everybody. Obviously, no knowledge of the 
functional relationship between profits and prices is necessary for being led to this 
conjecture. In our analysis of the results we try to disentangle the effects of imitation 
and cooperative behavior. 
 
In the last section of this paper our results will be discussed in the light of the recent 
experimental literature on imitation (Offerman, Potters, and Sonnemans forthcoming; 
Bosch-Domènech and Vriend forthcoming; Huck, Normann, and Oechssler 1999, 
2000). 
 
2. - The Model 
 
The experiment is based on a model of mill price competition on the circle (see 
Beckman 1968; see also Salop 1979). The model can be taken to represent a circular 
town around an insurmountable mountain. 
 
There are n identical firms, indexed by i  N={1,...,n}, equidistantly located on a circle 
with a distance of one unit between any two consecutive firms. Consumers are evenly 
located around the circle with a density of one. The individual demand amounts to one 
unit, and below a maximum price  p , demand is inelastic. Above  p  individual demand 
is zero. There are transportation costs of t per unit of distance. Consumers buy from the 
cheapest firm, including the transport costs. Denote by v  (0,n] the circle coordinate, 
 2and let v = i be the location of firm for all i  N. Hence, we can represent the local price 
at any particular location v by 
 
p(v) = min { p  ,  (pi + t v - i)}, 
n i ,..., 1 min

 
where pi  P  + denotes the price chosen by firm i  N, and P is the price set. If two 
or more firms offer the same price at some segment on the circle, these firms equally 
share such a segment. Let Lim denote the total lengths of all segments served by i and  
m-1 others. Then, the i-th total demand Li can be written as  
 





Lim     for all i  N. 
 
Let c denote marginal costs, then the i-th profits are represented by  
 
Hi = (pi - c) Li       for all i  N. 
 
Figure 1 shows an example with n = 4. Location is represented by the horizontal axis, 
while prices are represented by the vertical axis. Note that the circle is represented as a 
horizontal line starting and ending at the value 4. The vertical distances at locations i = 
1, 2, 3, and 4 represent the prices chosen by the firms. For all v  (0,4] the local price 
p(v) is represented by the fat line.  
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v 
 3Note that in Figure 1 there is a segment between firms 2 and 3 that is unserved. That is, 
since in such a segment prices plus transportation costs are above  p , the demand of 
consumers located there is zero. Furthermore, note also that since p4 + t = p3, firms 4 
and 3 share the segment served immediately at the left of firm 3. 
 
Table 1 shows the values of the parameters used in the experiment. 
 
Table 1: Values of the parameters used in the experiment 
Price set  Transportation cost  Marginal cost  Reservation price  Number of firms 
pi  [0,500]  t = 120  c = 107  p = 400  n = 3,4,5 
 
3. - Theoretical Benchmarks 
 
Throughout this paper we focus our analysis on the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, 
imitation equilibrium, and joint-profit maximization outcome. 
 
3.1. - Cournot-Nash Equilibrium 
 
Given that the reservation price is large enough, the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
of the price competition on the circle model is the strategy combination  
 
p
C = (t+c,...,t+c)        for  n = 2, 3, ....  
 
That is, the Cournot equilibrium of the model is unique, symmetric, and independent of 
the number of firms (see Beckmann 1968; see also Selten and Ostmann 2001).  
 
3.2. - Imitation Equilibrium 
 
This section presents a simplified definition of imitation equilibrium theory for games 
in which all players have the same strategy set. For the complete formulation of the 
theory we refer to Selten and Ostmann (2001). 
 
The reference group of a player i  N is the set of players j  i, j  N, whose strategies 
and payoffs are observed by i. In our experimental analysis the reference group of any i 
 4is formed by the left and right immediate neighbors. We say that i is a success leader at 
s = (s1,...,sn) if i’s payoff is at least as high as the highest payoff of a member of i’s 
reference group. Assume that i is not a success leader at s. Then, a player j in i’s 
reference group is a success example for i, if j has the highest payoff in i’s reference 
group and si  sj holds. We say that i has an imitation opportunity at s if i is not a 
success leader and there is at least one success example for i. We define a destination as 
a strategy combination without imitation opportunities. 
 
An imitation path is a sequence of strategy combinations with the following properties: 
(1) Each member of the sequence, except the first one, results from the immediately 
preceding one by all players with imitation opportunities taking one of them. (2) The 
sequence is continued as long as there are imitation opportunities.  
 
An imitation path may be infinite or may stop at a destination. Since a player may have 
more than one imitation opportunity, there are maybe many imitation paths starting at 
the same state. In this sense, an imitation process may generate many different imitation 
paths. 
 
Figure 2: Stability in imitation equilibrium 
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1 Only success leaders engage in exploratory deviations. 
2 The deviator’s payoff must be lower than at the equilibrium. 




* be a candidate for an imitation equilibrium. In the definition of an imitation 
equilibrium only deviations by success leaders are considered. Let i be a success leader. 
 5A deviation of i leads to a new state which we call a deviation start. A deviation path is 
an imitation path beginning with a deviation start.  
 
Two kinds of deviation paths have to be distinguished. In a path with deviator 
involvement, the deviator i himself/herself has an imitation opportunity at some point. In 
an imitation path without deviator involvement this does not happen, and the deviator 
stays at his/her deviation strategy. 
 
Suppose that a destination is reached by a deviation path without deviator involvement, 
and assume that at this destination the deviator’s payoff is lower than at s
*. In this case 
the deviator will return to strategy si
* in s
*. This leads to a strategy combination which 
we call the return start. An imitation path beginning at a return start is called a return 
path.  
 
An imitation equilibrium is defined as a destination satisfying the following four 
stability requirements (see Figure 2): 
1. - Finiteness requirement: No deviation path is infinite. 
2. - Involvement requirement: The destination reached by a deviation path with deviator 
involvement must be the imitation equilibrium.  
3. - Payoff requirement: At every destination reached by a deviation path without 
deviator involvement the deviator’s payoff is lower than at the imitation equilibrium. 
4. - Return requirement: Every return path is finite and reaches the imitation 
equilibrium as its destination. 
 
The interpretation of the finiteness requirement is straightforward. In the case of a 
destination reached by a deviation path with deviator involvement, the deviator has 
abolished experimentation in favor of imitation, and therefore cannot be expected to 
return. At a destination reached by a deviation path without deviator involvement, the 
deviator has no incentive to return, unless his/her payoff is lower at the imitation 
equilibrium. This leads to the payoff requirement. The return requirement is again 
straightforward. 
 
Once we have introduced the notion of imitation equilibrium, we can present its 
predictions for the price competition on the circle model. Interestingly enough, imitation 
 6equilibrium theory permits a less intense competition for the 4- and 5-player cases than 
for the 3-player case. The symmetric imitation equilibrium for the price competition on 
the circle model where the reference group of i is i’s left and right neighbors are  
 
  p





o) with  t + c  p
o  2t/3 + c   for n = 4, 5,... 
 
For the intuition on the difference in these theoretical predictions consider the following 
stability analysis at p = (p
o ,..., p
o), with p
o = t + c. This is the upper limit in the range of 
symmetric imitation equilibria with more than 3 firms. p
o = t + c is also the Cournot 
equilibrium for any possible number of firms higher than 2. Assume that there are four 
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o) is stable against 
this deviation. In the case of 3 firms, the stabilizing role of firm 4 in the above process 
is not present, and hence when firm 2 deviates by a price cut of , firms 1 and 3 imitate 
firm 2. Then (p
o - , p
o - , p
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firm 2 returns to the original strategy. However, since now  
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firm 2 has an imitation opportunity and moves to p
o - . Therefore, the return path does 
not lead to (p
o, p
o, p
o), which shows that this is not an imitation equilibrium. 
 
3.3. - Joint-Profit Maximization Outcome 
 
The unique symmetric joint-profit maximization outcome is p
J = ( p -1/2t,...,  p -1/2t), 
for any n = 2, 3,.... The price  p -1/2t is the highest one at which all customers are 
served. It can be seen easily that a higher price taken by all would decrease joint profits. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the theoretical benchmark, using the parameters presented in Table 
1. 
 
Table 2: Theoretical predictions 
Prediction  Prices  Individual Profits per Period 
Symmetric Imitation Equilibrium for n=3 187  80 
Symmetric Imitation Equilibrium for n>3 [187,227]  [80,120] 
Cournot Equilibrium  227  120 
Joint-Profit Maximization  340  233 
 
4. - Experimental Procedure 
 
We conducted 12 plays with 3 players, 6 plays with 4, and 6 plays with 5 players. The 
information on the market and the round-by-round information were the same in the 
three treatments. Namely, players knew that the experiment lasted 200 periods, that in 
each period each of them had to choose a price from 0 to 500 and that they could use up 
to 6 decimals, that the profit function was deterministic and dependent only on current 
prices, and that the exchange rate from Taler (the experimental currency) to Euro was 
0.0005 Euro/Taler. Furthermore, participants also knew that it was possible to get 
negative profits, and that for this reason everybody was endowed with an initial capital 
of 1500 Talers. They were told that if a participant reaches a cumulated capital of zero 
or lower, this participant would have to leave the experiment. They knew that such a 
participant would get 4 Euro for participating. After each round players got information 
on their own prices, profits, cumulated profits, and also on the prices and profits of the 
two immediate neighbors. Players, however, were not given information on the precise 
 8profit function, nor on the number of firms, nor on the consumers´ maximum 
willingness to pay. 
 
The experiments were run in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the 
University of Bonn. A total of 90 students were recruited through posters on campus. 
The computerized program was developed using RatImage (Abbink and Sadrieh 1995). 
Instructions were handed out to subjects and read aloud. An English translation of the 
instructions is shown in Appendix A. After instructions had been read and questions 
answered, subjects were randomly assigned to independent and visually isolated 
cubicles equipped with computer terminals. No communication between subjects was 
allowed. No time restrictions were imposed. On average, a session, including the 
instructions phase, lasted less than two hours. Players, right after the completion of the 
200 periods and before being privately paid in cash, were asked to fill a short 
questionnaire. In this questionnaire participants were asked to describe reasons for their 
decisions. We report the questionnaire in Appendix B. Average earnings were around 
16.15 Euro, with a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 22 Euro. 
 
Only one of the subjects got bankrupt. This happened in a play of the 5-person case. 
Since a bankruptcy changes the theoretical values of the game we exclude this play 
from the evaluation. 
 
5. - A First Look at the Results 
 
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the distributions of individual prices, grouped by intervals of 5, 
for the 12 plays with 3 players (Figure 3), the six plays with 4 players (Figure 4), and 
the six plays with 5 players (Figure 5). The intervals are of the form  
 
{5k, 5k+1, 5k+2, 5k+3, 5k+4}   with  k = 0, 1, 2,... 
 
The predictions of imitation, Cournot, and joint-profit maximization are marked in the 
figures. It can be seen immediately that in the 3-player plays, prices tend to be lower 
than in the 4- and 5-player cases. This is in agreement with the theory of imitation 
equilibrium. In the 3-player case there is only one symmetric imitation equilibrium at 
 9the price of 187. In the case of 4- or 5-players the symmetric imitation equilibria fill the 
whole range of prices from 187 to the Cournot equilibrium price at 227. 
 
In Figure 3 the three highest frequencies of intervals are in the range from 185 to 199. In 
Figure 4, however, the three highest frequencies are in the rage from 220 to 234. In 
Figure 5 the distribution is less smooth. The four highest frequencies are in the intervals 
from 195 to 199, from 220 to 224, from 245 to 249, and from 295 to 299. One cannot 
expect that the overall distribution of prices closely reflects any theoretical value which 
has to be approached by a learning process. However, it is important that behavior in 3-
person plays tends to be more competitive than in 4- and 5-person plays as predicted by 
imitation equilibrium theory, contrary to the economic intuition that more competitors 
entail lower prices. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of individual prices for the 12 plays with 3 players 
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Figure 4: Distribution of individual prices for the 6 plays with 4 players 









Figure 5: Distribution of individual prices for the 6 plays with 5 players 
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 11In Table 3 we see the average prices and median prices for 3-, 4-, and 5-player plays. 
The phenomenon of lower prices in the three-person case is also visible there. There is 
almost no difference between the 4- and 5-player cases. Admittedly, the average and 
median prices are above the range of imitation equilibrium prices in all three cases. 
Among the theories considered here, the Cournot equilibrium best explains the prices of 
Table 3. However this impression is treacherous. The averages hide what is really going 
on. In fact the individual plays are very different from each other. 
 
Table 3: Average and median prices by number of players 
Number of Players  Average Price  Median Price 
n=3 231  233 
n=4 242  244 
n=5 241  246 
 
The time series of all prices for play 1 of the 3-player case is shown by Figure 6. This is 
a clear example of behavior converging to the joint-profit maximization price 340. It 
can also be said that for some time, some players tried to gain an advantage by 
undercutting and were punished by others. In the comments player 2 explicitly 
mentioned the “education” of neighbors if they choose prices other than the joint-profit 
maximizing price of 340. Player 3 remarks “one player alone can destroy the 
equilibrium if he tries to gain at the cost of others”.  
 
Figure 7 shows the time series of all prices for play 8 of the 3-player case. This is an 
example of unstable cooperation. Cooperation is reached and breaks down after a while. 
The establishment of cooperation is repeated several times.  
 
Play 9 of the 3-player case is shown by Figure 8. This figure suggests convergence to 
the imitation equilibrium. Player 1 tried to establish cooperation but did not succeed. He 
writes in the description of the reasons for his decisions: “I have tried to increase prices 
even if this could imply losses in the short-run.” He answers the question about changes 
of his decision behavior in the course of the experiment as follows: “Unfortunately my 
neighbors did not follow, therefore I chose lower prices”. The other players said in the 
questionnaires that they wanted to maximize their payoffs. Figure 8 suggests that they 
tried to do this relying on imitation. 
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 14Figure 9 shows Play 2 of the 5-player case. This example shows that cooperation can 
happen even with 5 competitors.  
 
The fact that in the 3-player case prices tend to be somewhat lower than in the 4- and 5-
player cases suggests that imitation plays an important role in our data. However, 
cooperation is clearly very much present in the behavior of our subjects. Cooperative 
intentions are very often expressed in the questionnaires. We have to try to disentangle 
the effects of imitation and cooperation. 
 
6. - Cooperation 
 
In this section we shall introduce some operational definitions connected to cooperation. 
An average price is counted as cooperative if it is nearer to the joint-profit maximization 
price than to the Cournot equilibrium price. 
 
Cooperation is often interrupted by deviation and punishment. These interruptions may 
be of short duration like in Figure 6, or they may last for a longer time like in Figure 7. 
In order to remove occasional interruptions of cooperation we computed average prices 
for groups of 10 consecutive prices from 1 to 10, 11 to 20, and so on, until 191 to 200.  
 
In this way we receive a time series of 20 values for every play. We call this the block 
average time series. A play is classified as cooperative if the block average time series 
reaches at least once a value closer to the joint-profit maximization price than to the 
Cournot equilibrium price. A cooperative play is called a play with stable cooperation if 
the block average price remains cooperative until the end of the experiment, after it has 
become cooperative. Other cooperative plays are plays with unstable cooperation. 
 
For every cooperative play we define the number of periods before cooperation as the 
number of periods until a cooperative average price is reached for the first time in the 
play. In noncooperative plays this number is defined as to 200, in spite of the fact that 
occasionally a cooperative average price may also be reached in such plays. This 
happens mostly at the beginning of plays, when the subjects sometimes explore very 
high prices. Our definition of cooperation avoids classifying plays with only isolated 
cooperative average prices as cooperative. 
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Table 4 provides an overview concerning the incidence of cooperation. Cooperative 
plays are more frequent for plays with 3-players than for plays with 4- and 5-players. 
However, the difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, cooperation seems to 
be reached a little earlier in plays with 3-competitors than in those with 4- or 5- 
competitors. However, these differences are also not significant. 
 
Table 4: Cooperation 








n=3 7  4  5  146 
n=4 2  1  4  168 
n=5 2  2  4  155 
* The average is taken over all plays, including those without cooperation.
 
 
Typically, cooperation is reached by small steps. Some players increase their prices by 
small amounts and others follow. This creeping ascent to cooperation stops as soon as 
the joint-profit maximization price is reached, but sometimes also earlier. In this way 
the players who initiate cooperation do not loose too much. It is interesting that 
cooperation is possible without any knowledge of the exact relation between prices and 
profits. Cooperation can be achieved by a collective process of trial and error. 
 
7. - Stronger Competition before Cooperation among Three than Among Four and 
Five 
 
For every play we have computed the average price before cooperation. This is the 
average of all prices of a play before cooperation is reached for the first time. We also 
computed the averages of average prices before cooperation for all plays with 3-, 4-, and 
5-players. Table 5 shows the overall average prices, together with these averages for 
prices before cooperation.  
 
Table 5: Average price before cooperation 
Number of Players  Overall Average Prices  Averages for Prices before Cooperation 
n=3 231  211 
n=4 242  228 
n=5 241  223 
 
 16We can see that the average price before cooperation tends to be lower for n=3 than for 
n=4, 5. A permutation test on the basis of the average price before cooperation for the 
individual plays shows that this result is significant at the .01 level (two-sided). 
 
The result is a qualitative confirmation of imitation equilibrium theory. However, even 
for n=3 the average prices before cooperation is considerable higher than the theoretical 
value of 187. This is partially due to our definition of a cooperative average price. We 
count only prices above 283.5 as cooperative. Therefore, in the process of reaching 
cooperation many relatively high prices have to be attained before this limit is reached. 
Unfortunately, it is not easy to find a non-arbitrary definition of cooperation which 
includes the earlier part of the creeping ascent to the joint maximum. 
 
The result is remarkable since stronger competition for fewer players is not predicted by 
any other oligopoly theory. Imitation equilibrium predicts a lower price for 3-players 
than for 4- or 5-players, and this phenomenon is actually observed. 
 
8. - Direct Evidence for Imitation 
 
In the last section we have seen that the theory of imitation equilibrium is to some 
degree confirmed by the comparison of average prices before cooperation for n=3 on 
the one hand, and n=4, 5 on the other hand. In the following we want to explore the 
question whether there is also direct evidence for imitation on the level of individual 
behavior. 
 
Consider the situation of a player at the beginning of a period which is not the first one. 
Suppose that the player has an imitation opportunity. The last period’s price of the 
player to be imitated may be higher than the player’s own price. In this case we speak of 
an upward imitation opportunity. Analogously, the player has a downward imitation 
opportunity if the price to be imitated is lower than his/her own price. In principle, a 
player could have an upward and a downward imitation opportunity at the same time, 
because both of his/her neighbors may have equal profits higher than his/her own 
profits, and one of the neighbors may have a higher price and the other a lower one. 
However, there was no such case in our data. Thus, a player has either an upward or a 
downward imitation opportunity, or none at all. 
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A player may move his/her price up or down or not at all. Table 6 shows the relative 
frequencies of all combinations of imitation opportunity and price movement. The 
entries in this table on the diagonal are greater than those which would be obtained if 
the imitation opportunity and the movement would be independently distributed with 
the respective marginal distributions. This is how it should be in the presence of 
imitation, since an upward imitation opportunity should predominantly lead to an 
upward movement, a downward imitation opportunity to a downward movement, and 
no imitation opportunity to no movement at all. The diagonal surplus is the sum of the 
entries in the diagonal minus the sum of the values these entries would have under the 
counterfactual independence assumption described above. In the case of Table 6 the 
diagonal surplus is .11. 
 
Table 6: Imitation opportunity and movement 
Movement 
          Up         Down         None 
 
Upward   0.09          0.03              0.03 
 
Imitation     Downward  0.11           0.17          0.13 
Opportunity 
  None   0.19          0.08           0.16 
 
 
A table like Table 6 can be constructed for each play separately. For 22 out of the 23 
plays the diagonal surplus is positive. A binomial test shows that this is significant on 
the .001 level (one-sided). Consequently, we can say that imitation is clearly present in 
the behavior of the subjects.  
 
9. - Cooperation and Imitation 
 
Table 6 also shows the influence of attempts towards cooperation. Downward imitation 
opportunities are often not taken by players who try to achieve cooperation. Such 
players will also move upwards in situations where there is not imitation opportunity.  
 
For each player let a21 be the number of upward movements and a22 the number of 
downward movements in cases of a downward imitation opportunity. The quotient 
a=a21/a22 measures the tendency of a player to move upwards rather than downward in 
 18spite of a downward imitation opportunity. We can look at the quotients a=a21/a22 as an 
indicator of the cooperativeness of a player. The more cooperative a player is, the more 
willing he/she may be to signal cooperativeness by an upward movement in face of a 
downward imitation opportunity. Therefore we call a=a21/a22 the cooperativeness 
indicator of a player.  
 
The maximal cooperativeness indicator of a play is defined as the maximum of all the 
cooperativeness indicators of all players in this play. We computed a biserial correlation 
coefficient between the cooperativeness of a play in the sense of the definition given in 
section 6, and the maximal cooperativeness indicator of a play. This biserial correlation 
extended over the 23 plays is equal to .472, which is significant at the 5% level, two-
tailed.  
 
A player is called a cooperator if his/her cooperativeness indicator is greater than one. 
This means that a cooperator is more willing to move upwards than downward in the 
face of a downward imitation opportunity. This definition of a cooperator is quite strong 
and does not exclude the possibility that somebody that is not classified as a cooperator 
also sometimes raises the price as a cooperative signal, even if most of the time he/she 
does not behave in this way in the face of downward imitation opportunities. 
 
The presence of at least one cooperator in a play seems to facilitate the attainment of 
cooperation. This is shown in table 7. Clearly, table 7 has more entries on the main 
diagonal than outside the main diagonal. This is significant by Fisher’s exact test on the 
1% level of significance.  
Table 7: Plays with cooperators 
Cooperative Noncooperative 
      P l a y s    P l a y s  
 
At least one cooperator          7            1 
 
     No cooperator            4            11 
 
 
A cooperator more often than not chooses to increase his/her price in order to induce 
other players to follow him/her upward, even in the face of a downward imitation 
opportunity. Such players may initiate a creeping ascent to a high price level as shown 
by figures 6, 7, and 9. 
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The opposite behavioral effects of cooperation and imitation can also be seen in the fact 
that the diagonal surpluses tend to be lower in plays with cooperation than in plays 
without cooperation. A permutation test yields a significance on the .01 level (two-
sided). There is also a positive Spearman rank-order correlation of rs= .556 between the 
number of periods before cooperation and the diagonal surplus. This confirms the 
impression that a play shows the more presence of imitation the less cooperative it is.  
 
The behavior of the subjects is partially influenced by imitative tendencies, and partially 
by attempts to cooperate. Both kinds of behavior have different consequences. One may 
say that cooperation crowds out imitation, when it happens. Nevertheless we do not 
want to exclude the possibility that some other influences not considered here enter the 
picture. Thus, probably also exploratory behavior has a role, as suggested by the theory 
of imitation equilibrium. 
 
10. - Discussion 
 
Our results show that behavior in the price competition oligopoly on the circle can be 
explained by imitation and cooperation. Imitation has the tendency to move prices in the 
direction of imitation equilibrium, whereas cooperation has the tendency to move prices 
upwards in the direction of the joint-profit maximization price. 
 
Imitation has also been observed in other oligopoly experiments (Offerman, Potters, and 
Sonnemans forthcoming; Bosch-Domènech and Vriend forthcoming; Huck, Normann, 
and Oechssler 1999, 2000).  
 
Offerman, Potters, and Sonnemans (forthcoming) report on 3-person Cournot 
oligopolies repeated over 100 periods. There were three treatments called Q, Qq, and 
Qq. In the first treatment Q only feedback on aggregated quantities was given, in the 
second treatment Qq also feedback on individual quantities, and finally in the treatment 
Qq, in addition to this, feedback on individual profits were given. Especially their 
treatment Qq shows strong tendencies towards imitation, but also towards collusive 
outcomes. This is in agreement with our findings. In the treatments Q and Qq there 
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complete information about the game, and receive enough feedback for the computation 
of best replies. Nevertheless, in treatment Qq, with information on individual actions 
and profits, Nash equilibrium does not seem to attract behavior, while the imitation 
prediction is approached very often. 
 
Bosch- Domènech and Vriend (forthcoming) conducted Cournot oligopolies with two or 
three players, extended over 22 rounds. They had three treatments “easy,” “hard” and 
“hardest,” which differ with respect to the effort required for profit calculations. The 
hypothesis is that imitation will drive behavior in the last two treatments. They 
evaluated mainly the last 2 periods. In the “easy”-duopoly case, results in the last 2 
periods were concentrated on the joint-profit maximization and Cournot equilibrium. In 
the “easy”-triopoly experiments, behavior is around Cournot equilibrium. Finally, in the 
“hard” and “hardest” conditions, in both the duopoly and triopoly experiments, behavior 
is dispersed over a wide range, including the imitation range. However, in view of the 
low number of repetitions, this study is not easy to compare with ours. 
 
Two papers by Huck, Norman, and Oechssler (1999, 2000) report on various oligopoly 
experiments. In the first paper, Cournot oligopolies with four players are run over 40 
periods. In each period a player could change his/her action with a probability of 2/3. 
There are 5 treatments varying with respect to the information on game structure and 
feedback. In these games the imitation equilibrium is the Walrasian outcome with equal 
quantities for all players. The results show that information on the game structure 
decreases competitiveness, whereas more feedback on profits and actions of the others 
increases it. Imitation equilibrium is a theory for low market information and good 
feedback about actions and profits of other players. Under these conditions Huck, 
Norman, and Oechssler find evidence for imitation. However, cooperation seems to be 
less visible in their games. Maybe, in similar experiments run over a greater number of 
periods more cooperation could be observed. 
 
In the Cournot oligopoly experiments by Huck, Norman, and Oechssler average 
quantities were often higher than Cournot quantities. This is somewhat surprising in 
view of the old experimental oligopoly literature. In the 50s, Cournot theory was 
strongly rejected by theoreticians but actually, earlier experimental research supported 
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Deviations, when they occurred, tended to be in the direction of lower outputs and of 
more cooperation (Sauermann and Selten 1959, Hoggatt 1959, Fouraker and Siegel 
1963, and Stern 1967). 
 
The second paper by Huck, Norman, and Oechssler (2000) reports on oligopoly 
experiments with differentiated products run with four players over 40 periods. There 
were treatments with quantity variation and price variation, and also with feedback on 
average actions of the others on the one hand, and in addition to this, feedback on 
individual actions and profits of the others, on the other hand. The subjects could make 
use of a profit calculator which permitted them to compute best-replies. In the high 
feedback cases imitation seems to be more important than in the low feedback cases 
under quantity and price competition.  
 
In the price variation experiments, under both feedback conditions, there is a substantial 
presence of prices higher than the Nash price, indicating some tendencies toward 
cooperation. Maybe also here, the picture could be different for a greater number of 
periods. Since subjects had access to a profit calculator in all games, regardless of the 
feedback conditions, it might be argued that the differences between low and high 
feedback must be due to social comparison effects rather than to cognitive factors. 
However, it is quite possible that many subjects who receive feedback on profits and 
actions of the others, readily rely on this kind of information and do not even try to use 
the profit calculator. The subjects may not be aware of the fact that hypothetical profit 




ABBINK, K., and A. SADRIEH. 1995. “RatImage-Research Assistance Toolbox for 
Computer-Aided Human Behavior Experiments,” SFB Discussion Paper B-325, 
University of Bonn. 
BECKMANN, M. J. 1986. Location Theory. New York: Random House. 
BOSCH-DOMÈNECH, A., and N.J. VRIEND. Forthcoming. Imitation of Successful 
Behavior in Cournot Markets. Economic Journal. 
FOURAKER, L. E. and SIEGEL, S. 1963. Bargaining Behavior. New York: McGraw 
Hill. 
HOGGATT, A. C. 1959. An Experimental Business Game, Behavioral Science, 4:192-
203. 
HUCK, S., H.T. NORMANN, and J. OECHSSLER. 1999. Leaning in Cournot 
Oligopoly-An Experiment. Economic Journal, 109:C80-C95. 
HUCK, S., H.T. NORMANN, and J. OECHSSLER. 2000. Does Information about 
Competitors´ Actions Increase or Decrease Competition in Experimental Oligopoly 
Markets? International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18:39-57. 
OFFERMAN, T., J. POTTERS, and J. SONNEMANS. Forthcoming. Imitation and 
Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment. Review of Economic Studies. 
RHODE, P., and M. STEGEMAN. 2001. Non-Nash Equilibria of Darwinian Dynamics 
with Applications to Duopoly. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
19:415-453. 
SALOP, S. C. 1979. Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, Bell Journal of 
Economics, 10:141-156. 
SAUERMANN, H. and SELTEN, R. 1959. Ein Oligopolexperiment, Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 115:427-471. 
SELTEN, R., and A. OSTMANN. 2001. Imitation Equilibrium. Homo Oeconomicus, 
43:111-149. 
STERN D. H. 1967. Some Notes on Oligopoly Theory and Experiments, 255-281, in: 
M. Shubik (ed), Essays in Mathematical Economics, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
TODT, H. 1970. Ein Markt mit komplexen Interessenstrukturen. Eine theoretische und 
experimentelle Untersuchung. Unpublished Habilitation Thesis. Frankfurt. 
 23TODT, H. 1972. Pragmatic Decisions on an Experimental Market. In H. 
Sauermann (ed.): Contributions to Experimental Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 608-634. 
Tübingen: Mohr. 
TODT, H. 1975. Anbieterverhalten bei komplexen Marktstrukturen. In O. Becker & R. 
Richter (eds.): Dynamische Wirtschaftstheorie. Theorie–Experiment–Entscheidung. 
H. Sauermann zum 70. Geburtstag, pp. 232-246. Tübingen: Mohr. 






Appendix A: The Written Instructions 
 
Rounds: The experiment is composed of 200 rounds. 
Prices: In every round each participant has to choose a price between 0 and 500. You 
can use up to 6 decimals. 
Profit: Profits depend on prices. Randomness does not play any role at all in this 
relation. The connection between prices and profit is the same in every round. This 
connection will not be announced to you though. Profit can also be negative. 
Cumulated Profit: You begin with an initial capital of 1500 Taler. The cumulated profit 
of the next round is the sum of the current profit and the previous cumulated profit. 
Feedback: After every round you get information on: 
1.  Your own price, your profit, and your cumulated profit. 
2.  The prices and profits of two other participants, with whom you interact and 
who are called your “left” and “right” neighbours. These neighbours stay the 
same in every round, but are kept anonymous during the whole experiment. 
Besides your neighbours, other participants might interact with you. 
Bankruptcy: If your cumulated profit becomes zero or negative, you have bankrupted 
and therefore must leave the experiment. In the case one of your neighbours bankrupts 
in the course of the experiment, you will be informed of this. 
Payment: The final cumulated profit after the 200 rounds will be paid to you according 
to the following exchange rate: 1 € per 2000 Taler. Moreover you will receive a lump 
sum payment of 4 € irrespective of your performance in the experiment. In the case you 
bankrupt, you will receive a total of 4 €. 
 
Appendix B: The Questionnaire 
 
1. - Describe briefly the reasons for your decisions: 
2. - Did your strategy change during the course of the experiment? If so, how did it 
change? 
3. - Would you follow a different strategy in retrospect? If so, which and why? 
4. - Comments on the experiment: 
 